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Abstract:  Leonard Savage famously contravened his own theory when first confronting the 
Allais Paradox, but then convinced himself that he had made an error.  We examine the 
formal structure of Savage’s ‘error-correcting’ reasoning in the light of (i) behavioural 
economists’ claims to identify the latent preferences of individuals who violate conventional 
rationality requirements and (ii) John Broome’s critique of arguments which presuppose that 
rationality requirements can be achieved through reasoning.  We argue that Savage’s 
reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s critique, but does not provide support for the view 
that behavioural scientists can identify and counteract errors in people’s choices. 
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One of the most famous incidents in the history of behavioural economics took place in Paris 
in May 1952.1 The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) was holding a 
symposium on ‘Foundations and applications of the theory of risk-bearing’. At the meeting, 
Leonard Savage presented the axiomatization of subjective expected utility theory that would 
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form the core of The Foundations of Statistics (Savage, 1954) and become the canonical 
statement of the theory of rational individual choice. Maurice Allais presented an initial 
version of a critique of expected utility theory that would subsequently be published in 
Econometrica and become a founding text of behavioural economics (Allais, 1953). During a 
lunch break, Allais invited Savage to respond to two hypothetical decision ‘situations’ 
requiring choices between pairs of gambles. Taken together, Savage’s responses were 
inconsistent with ‘P2’, one of the fundamental axioms of his own theory. In The Foundations 
of Statistics, Savage refers to this episode and explains the inferences that he has drawn from 
it. He writes: 
When the two situations were first presented, I immediately expressed preference 
for Gamble 1 as opposed to Gamble 2 and for Gamble 4 as opposed to Gamble 3 
[thereby contravening P2], and I still feel an intuitive attraction to those 
preferences. But I have since accepted the following way of looking at the two 
situations…  
He explains how, after looking at the situations in a particular way, he came to prefer Gamble 
3 to Gamble 4, and concludes: 
It seems to me that in reversing my preference between Gambles 3 and 4 I have 
corrected an error. (1954: 103) 
 Our paper examines the formal structure of the mental process by which, on Savage’s 
account, he comes to satisfy P2 and, in doing so, to correct an error. Despite the amount of 
attention that the interchange between Allais and Savage has already received, we believe 
that new insights can be gained by looking at Savage’s error-correcting reasoning in the light 
of recent developments in behavioural economics and cognitive science and in the philosophy 
of rationality and reasoning. 
 The idea that many frequently-observed contraventions of rational choice theory are 
the result of errors that the relevant decision makers would wish to correct is a common 
theme in current behavioural economics, and is often invoked to justify apparently 
paternalistic public policies, such as ‘nudging’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). As Infante, 
Lecouteux and Sugden (2016) have argued, this idea seems to presuppose the existence of 
some mode of error-free reasoning by which individuals can construct preferences that satisfy 
the axioms of rational choice theory. Behavioural economists’ claims to be able to design 
policies that counteract error depend on there being a method by which an outside observer – 
the ‘analyst’, ‘expert’ or ‘choice architect’ – can identify mental operations that individuals in 
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fact carry out but would wish to correct. Since standard versions of rational choice theory 
lack any model of reasoning processes, these presuppositions are difficult to assess.    
 In a major philosophical work that has received insufficient attention from economists 
and decision theorists, Broome (2013) examines the relationship between rationality and 
reasoning. Broome points out that many writers on rationality ‘seem to think that they have 
finished their job when they have described requirements of rationality’. He suggests that 
these writers ‘must believe that, starting from knowledge of a particular requirement, you can 
reason your way actively to satisfying that requirement’ (2013: 208–209), and asks whether 
that belief is justified. His answer identifies serious problems in modes of (purported) 
reasoning that proceed from beliefs about what rationality requires. He proposes an account 
of ‘rationality through reasoning’ that can allow a person to arrive at mental states that satisfy 
certain kinds of rationality requirement without having any prior knowledge of the 
requirements themselves.  He argues this account of reasoning is psychologically plausible, 
and that it can represent not only ‘correct’ reasoning, but also mental operations that ‘seem 
right’ to the person who carries them out.  
  Seen against the background of these intellectual developments, Savage’s response to 
Allais is of great interest. The formal contribution of The Foundations of Statistics to rational 
choice theory is an analysis of coherence principles that apply to a person’s preferences 
between ‘acts’ under uncertainty (represented as assignments of ‘consequences’ to ‘states of 
the world’). Almost all the supporting argument is structured to justify those principles as 
requirements of rationality; there is no formal analysis of reasoning processes. To this extent, 
Savage falls into Broome’s class of writers on rationality who seem to think it sufficient to 
describe requirements. But in reporting his considered response to Allais’s challenge, Savage 
gives an informal description of how, by reasoning outside his axiomatic model, he came to 
satisfy one of its requirements and, in doing so, to correct an error. 
 Using the formalisation of Broome’s account of reasoning presented by Dietrich, 
Staras and Sugden (2019), and drawing on the psychological distinction between the 
automatic mental processes of ‘System 1’ and the conscious reasoning processes of ‘System 
2’ (Wason and Evans, 1975; Kahneman, 2003), we reconstruct Savage’s informal reasoning 
as an explicit sequence of mental operations, in order to address two main issues. The first 
issue concerns the internal logic of Savage’s reasoning. Is this reasoning vulnerable to 
Broome’s objections?  Does it make an illegitimate move from recognising some property of 
preferences as rationally required to being able to make oneself satisfy that requirement by 
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reasoning? As we will show, the answer is ‘No’. This raises the second issue, which concerns 
the concept of error-correction that behavioural economists use when justifying ‘paternalistic’ 
policies. Does Savage’s mode of reasoning show the legitimacy of that concept?  
 The structure of our paper is as follows. In Section 1, we discuss how the concept of 
error has been used in behavioural economics. In Section 2, we examine how Savage uses his 
informally stated Sure-thing Principle in justifying P2 as a requirement of rationality. In 
Section 3, we look at Savage’s account of how he violated P2 when he first faced Allais’s 
situations, and at his explanation of the ‘intuitive attraction’ of the preferences he revealed in 
those decisions. In Section 4, we outline the main features of Broome’s conceptual 
framework, as formalised by Dietrich et al. (2019). Section 5 presents our reconstruction of 
the reasoning by which Savage revised his preferences over Allais’s gambles, thereby coming 
to satisfy P2. We show that this reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s objections. In 
Section 6, we examine Savage’s concept of error and contrast it with that used in behavioural 
economics. We argue that, although there is a coherent sense in which Savage corrects what 
he judges to be an error, this achievement does not provide support for the view that 
behavioural scientists can identify errors in people’s choices that can be counteracted by 
suitably-designed interventions. Section 7 concludes. 
1. The concept of error in behavioural economics 
The idea that violations of coherence principles of rational choice theory are errors appears in 
one of the earliest and most important contributions to what is now called ‘behavioural 
economics’ – the paper in which Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose prospect theory. 
Kahneman and Tversky begin by presenting a variety of experimental results which ‘appear 
to invalidate expected utility theory as a descriptive model’ (p. 274). These results include an 
instance of the common consequence effect – the effect revealed in Savage’s initial response 
to Allais’s situations. They also include an instance of the closely related common ratio 
effect, which also featured in Allais’s (1953) critique of expected utility theory. Kahneman 
and Tversky then propose prospect theory as an explanation of their experimental results. In 
the final paragraph of this ‘Theory’ section, they summarise the differences between prospect 
theory and expected utility theory, and conclude:  
These departures from expected utility theory must lead to normatively 
unacceptable consequences, such as inconsistencies, intransitivities, and violations 
of dominance. Such anomalies of preference are normally corrected by the 
decision maker when he realizes that his preferences are inconsistent, intransitive, 
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or inadmissible. In many situations, however, the decision maker does not have 
the opportunity to discover that his preferences could violate decision rules that he 
wishes to obey. In these circumstances the anomalies implied by prospect theory 
are expected to occur. 
  Taken at face value, the ideas expressed in this passage are remarkably similar to 
those in Savage’s response to the common consequence effect. The phenomena that 
Kahneman and Tversky describe as ‘normatively unacceptable’ are violations of rationality 
requirements of expected utility theory. According to Kahneman and Tversky, a reasonable 
decision maker would wish to satisfy those requirements. The decision maker’s failure to do 
so in certain situations is a predictable consequence of human psychology, but it is also an 
error that he would want to correct, and could correct if (like Savage) he became aware that 
he was violating a rationality requirement. However, Kahneman and Tversky do not describe 
any process of reasoning that a decision maker might use to correct such errors. It is because 
Savage does describe such a process that his response to Allais’s challenge is so interesting. 
 From the first years of behavioural economics, the question of whether ‘anomalies’ 
(i.e., patterns of choice that violate standard rationality requirements) should be interpreted as 
errors has remained open. Some early psychologically-based alternatives to expected utility 
theory were explicitly presented as challenges to the normative status of that theory (e.g., 
Allais’s 1979 moments-of-utility model, and Loomes and Sugden’s 1982 regret theory). 
There is a continuing strand of literature in which non-standard choice models are advanced 
with a claim of capturing aspects of rationality that standard theory ignores (e.g., the 
heuristic-based theory of Gigerenzer et al., 1999, and the reason-based theory of Dietrich and 
List, 2016). Kahneman himself has sometimes resisted the ‘error’ interpretation of anomalies 
when it has been used by critics of his research programme (e.g., Kahneman, 1996). It is 
perhaps possible to read the passage we have quoted as a tactical concession made by 
empirical psychologists who were launching a bold attack on received economic theory and 
who, at the time, were not particularly concerned with normative issues.  
 However, questions about error have become more significant since the early 2000s, 
when behavioural economists began to consider the normative implications of their findings, 
and to propose public policies based on ‘behavioural insights’. Much recent work in 
normative behavioural economics is premised on the assumption that (as Thaler and Sunstein 
put it in their book Nudge) ‘individuals make pretty bad decisions – decisions that they would 
not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited 
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cognitive abilities, and complete self-control’. Much of the evidence that is presented in 
support of this assumption takes the form of violations of conventional rationality 
requirements. Public policy, it is argued, should be designed to counter individuals’ tendency 
to make bad decisions. Crucially, its aim should be to ‘make choosers better off, as judged by 
themselves’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 5; italics in original). Or, as Thaler (2015: 326) puts 
it, he and Sunstein ‘just want to reduce what people would themselves call errors’. The 
implication is that an individual’s judgements about what makes her better off are expressed 
in the choices she herself would make in the absence of, or after correcting for, errors induced 
by inadequate attention, information, cognitive ability and self-control. By abstracting from 
the effects of these errors on observable choice behaviour, analysts can reconstruct 
individuals’ latent (or ‘underlying’ or ‘true’) preferences.  
 If latent preferences satisfy standard rationality conditions (which is not self-evident), 
the satisfaction of latent preferences can be used as a criterion for guiding public policy. The 
fundamental hypothesis that violations of rationality requirements result from interactions 
between error-inducing psychological processes and coherent latent preferences and beliefs 
appears also in many other contributions to normative behavioural economics (e.g., 
Bleichrodt, Pinto-Prades and Wakker, 2001; Camerer et al., 2004; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007; 
Bershears et al., 2008; Salant and Rubinstein, 2008; Manzini and Mariotti, 2012). 
 A related approach to normative behavioural economics, proposed by Bernheim and 
Rangel (2009) and Bernheim (2016), accepts as data only preferences that have been revealed 
in an individual’s choice behaviour. However, data from decision situations in which the 
decision-maker ‘incorrectly perceives the choice set’ are ignored (Bernheim and Rangel, 
2009: 83). Thus, individuals are assumed not to make errors about their own subjective 
preferences about outcomes, but the effects of errors of belief are screened out of choice data. 
By characterising common anomalies as resulting from psychologically induced 
misperceptions about choice sets, and by treating the real properties of choice sets as 
objective facts, Bernheim and Rangel can claim to have a method for retrieving the subjective 
preferences of individuals whose choices contravene rationality requirements.  
 Some writers represent the relationship between error and latent preference in terms 
of the ‘System 1/ System 2’ classification of mental processes proposed by Wason and Evans 
(1975) and developed by Kahneman (2003). System 1 is fast and automatic, and generates 
impressions, intuitions, feelings and impulses. System 2 is slow and under conscious control; 
using it is effortful. Operating on the outputs of System 1, System 2 constructs explicit 
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thoughts in an orderly way. The distinction between the two systems is used by Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008: 19–39) as a way of organising behavioural findings, and is the central theme 
of Kahneman’s (2011) overview of his contributions to psychology and behavioural 
economics. In both cases, the suggestion is that the automatic processes of System 1 are 
liable to induce unconsidered preferences and judgements that are systematically biased, and 
that the conscious reasoning processes of System 2 are capable of correcting these biases. 
This idea is stated more explicitly by Kahneman and Sunstein (2006: 92) in a discussion of 
the psychology of moral intuitions: ‘System 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment 
problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may 
endorse, correct, or override’. However, little is said about the form that System 2 reasoning 
might take, or about the limitations it might have. 
 For our purposes in this paper, it is not necessary to go further into to the varied  
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of these analyses of error.2 It is sufficient to note 
that what they have in common reflects the fact that they have been developed in response to 
a common problem. That problem is of adapting conventional welfare economics, based as it 
is on the criterion of preference-satisfaction, to empirical findings that show that individuals’ 
revealed preferences are often highly sensitive to features of decision situations that seem to 
have no relevance for welfare. By reconceptualising preference-satisfaction in terms of latent 
rather than revealed preferences, economists can continue to use much of the formal 
apparatus of traditional welfare economics. By defining a person’s latent preferences as the 
preferences she would reveal in the absence of error, they can continue to uphold the 
principle of respecting each person’s judgements about her own good – the idea that is 
expressed in the ‘as judged by themselves’ clause that is now widely used by behavioural 
economists. And if psychology can supply an empirical theory of error, economists can 
continue to infer welfare-relevant preferences from observable choices. Following Infante et 
al. (2016), we will use the term behavioural welfare economics for all forms of normative 
economics with these features.   
 It is crucial to the methodology of behavioural welfare economics that, in the process 
of retrieving an individual’s latent preferences, the ‘errors’ that are screened out are errors 
according to that individual’s own standards – in Thaler’s expression, ‘what people would 
themselves call errors’. If policy interventions are to be directed at people in general (rather 
                                                            
2 These underpinnings are examined in more detail by Infante et al. (2016).  
8 
 
tailored to the needs of specific individuals), the concept of error must be intersubjective – 
error according to standards that almost everyone accepts. Thaler and Sunstein make the 
implicit claim that failures of attention, information, cognitive ability and self-control fall into 
this category. It is also crucial to distinguish between this concept of error and the violation 
of rationality conditions. For example, suppose that everyone agrees with Kahneman and 
Tversky that intransitivities of preference are normatively unacceptable. Now imagine a 
person who chooses x from {x, y}, y from {y, z} and z from {x, z}. If we are to attribute 
transitive latent preferences to this person, and if we assume that choices reveal strict 
preferences, at least one of the three revealed preferences must be ‘corrected’.  But a 
behavioural welfare economist needs to know which preference to correct. That requires the 
identification of an error of mental processing in the formation of a specific preference. 
Identifying the violation of a rationality requirement is not enough.  
 A different way of thinking about error is proposed by Gilboa (2010: 3–4). Gilboa’s 
starting point is not the problem of providing policy guidance; it is that of assessing the 
normative status of rational choice theory in the light of the empirical findings of behavioural 
economics.  Expressing apparent regret that ‘phenomenally elegant classical decision theory’ 
has proved to be so easily disconfirmed in simple experiments like Kahneman and Tversky’s, 
Gilboa asks what we (presumably, decision theorists) should do. He considers two alternative 
approaches. One, which he characterises as the methodology of descriptive behavioural 
economics, is to bring the theory closer to reality by incorporating the inelegant 
psychological factors that explain observed violations of the classical theory. The alternative 
approach is ‘to go out and preach our classical theories, that is, to use them as normative 
ones’, thus trying to ‘bring reality closer to the theory’. According to Gilboa’s definition, ‘a 
mode of behaviour is rational for a given decision maker if, when confronted with the 
analysis of her behavior, the decision maker does not wish to change it’ (2010: 3). By ‘the 
analysis’, Gilboa seems to mean a theoretical analysis that uses the principles of classical 
decision theory. (Remember that his imagined audience is of people who can be urged to go 
out and preach that particular theory.)  Then:  
If decision makers become convinced once the theory has been explained to them 
and they then wish to change their choices (that is, if their choices were irrational 
to them), we may declare the classical theory successful as a normative one. It 
would indeed be reasonable to preach the classical theory and help decision 
makers make better (as judged by themselves) decisions. (2010: 4) 
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 Gilboa does not presuppose that it is rational for people to conform to the 
requirements of classical decision theory. Rather, the test of whether that theory is rational is 
whether it can be preached successfully.  But if in fact the theory can be preached 
successfully, Gilboa treats violations of it as errors, as judged by the decision makers 
themselves. He does not explain the mode of reasoning by which individuals correct these 
errors, but the implication is that some mode of reasoning with this error-correcting effect can 
be activated by another person’s ‘preaching’.3 
 If, for whatever reason, one entertains the idea that violations of rationality 
requirements are evidence of errors that decision makers can recognise as such and can 
correct by reasoning, Savage’s response to Allais is a natural place to look for clues about 
how such reasoning could work. 
2. The Sure-thing Principle and Savage’s P2 axiom 
Savage’s (1954) axiomatization of subjective expected utility theory (SEUT) is one of the 
greatest achievements of decision theory. His contribution is to show that the whole structure 
of SEUT is implied by a small set of axioms, formulated in a remarkably frugal theoretical 
framework and using only concepts that can be observed in choice behaviour. As an 
explanation of the value of an axiomatic approach, he draws an analogy with logic and says: 
‘[T]he main use I would make of [my axioms] is normative, to police my own decisions for 
consistency and, where possible, to make complicated decisions depend on simpler ones’ 
(1954: 20).  
 Savage works in a theoretical framework whose primitives are states (of the world), 
consequences, acts (i.e., assignments of consequences to states), and (strict) preferences. Sets 
of states are events. A person’s preferences are described by a binary relation ≤ among acts. If 
f and g are acts, g ≤ f is interpreted as ‘g is not preferred to f’ or, equivalently, as ‘f is 
preferred or indifferent to g’. The two interpretations are equivalent because Savage excludes 
                                                            
3 For this empirical test of the rationality of a theory to be well defined, Gilboa needs an operational 
definition or construct of ‘wishing to change’ a choice. We are assuming that the definition is in terms 
of decision-making behaviour (e.g., the person has made a provisional choice, but revises it after 
being preached to). But one might use a definition that would allow the person to continue to behave 
as before, but after being preached to, wishes that she chose differently. We do not need to resolve 
this issue. 
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the possibility of non-comparability.4 Formally, (strict) preference for f over g is defined as 
the negation of f ≤ g; indifference between f and g is defined as the conjunction of g ≤ f and f 
≤ g. Savage’s P1 axiom requires that ≤ satisfies completeness (i.e., for all acts f and g, f ≤ g or 
g ≤ f) and transitivity (i.e., for all acts f, g and h, [f ≤ g ∧ g ≤ h] ⇒ f ≤ h). 
 Given the assumption that P1 holds, Savage’s formalism is equivalent to the modern 
one, since g ≤ f is equivalent to f ≽ g for a standard (complete and transitive) relation ≽ of 
weak preference. However, Savage’s use of strict preference as a primitive reflects his 
determination to build his theory on observable concepts: ‘I think it of great importance that 
preference, and indifference, between f and g be determined, at least in principle, by decisions 
between acts and not by response to introspective questions’. Elucidating the proposition that 
a person prefers f to g, he says: ‘Loosely speaking, what this means is that if he were required 
to decide between f and g, no other acts being available, he would decide on f’ (1954: 17). 
‘Loosely speaking’ and ‘at least in principle’ hint at a tension between two of Savage’s aims. 
On the one hand, he wants to develop a theory of decision that is open to empirical 
falsification by observable behaviour – not because he expects that its predictions will always 
be confirmed, but as what he sees as good scientific practice (1954: 20). On the other, he 
wants to provide normative justifications for specific principles of rational choice. Those 
justifications are addressed to actual human beings. He is telling his readers that they are 
required by principles of rationality to act like the abstract agents in his theory. In explaining 
why this is so, he quite properly steps outside his parsimonious behaviourist interpretations 
and appeals to the reader’s mental experience.5 In doing so, he effectively interprets his 
theory – with formal constructs such as preferences, conditional preferences, probabilities, 
and utilities – as a representation of a richer world that includes mental states as well as 
behaviour. 
 Our paper is primarily concerned with Savage’s second axiom, P2. Using the 
definition that two acts f and g agree in an event E if, for all states s ∈ E, f(s) = g(s), and 
using Ω to denote the set of all states of the world, we can write this postulate as: 
                                                            
4 Savage recognises that in reality there can also be ‘introspective sensations of indecision or 
vacillation’ but, on grounds of parsimony, does not represent this possibility in his model (1954: 17–
21). 
5  If Savage had wanted to avoid all use of mentalistic concepts, he might have tried to justify his 
axioms on instrumental grounds, for example by using money pump arguments. In the light of Cubitt 
and Sugden’s (2001) demonstration of the general invalidity of money pump arguments, we think that 
he made a wise choice. 
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 Savage’s P2. If acts f, g, f ′, g′ and event E are such that: 
(1)  in Ω\E, f agrees with g, and f ′ agrees with g′, 
(2)  in E, f agrees with f ′, and g agrees with g′, 
(3)  g ≤ f; 
then g ′≤ f ′. 
To see the intuition behind P2, suppose that (1) and (2) hold. Given (1), it seems that the 
preference ranking of f relative to g, and also the preference ranking of f ′ relative to g′, 
should rationally depend only on the consequences of the relevant acts in E. But given (2), 
these consequences are the same for f as for f ′, and the same for g as for g′. Thus, the ranking 
of f relative to g should be the same as the ranking of f ′ relative to g′.  
 As a preliminary to stating this axiom, Savage presents the Sure-thing Principle: 
If the person would not prefer f to g, either knowing that the event B obtained, or 
knowing that the event ~B [i.e., the complement of B] obtained, then he does not 
prefer f to g. Moreover (provided he does not regard B as virtually impossible) if 
he would definitely prefer g to f, knowing that B obtained, and if he would not 
prefer f to g, knowing that B did not obtain, then he definitely prefers g to f. (1954: 
21–22) 
Savage’s illustration is the case of a businessman who is deciding whether to buy a piece of 
property. The outcome of that decision may depend on whether the upcoming US presidential 
election is won by the Republican candidate or by the Democrat (there are no others). The 
businessman ‘finds’ or ‘decides’ (Savage uses both expressions) that he would buy if he 
knew the Republican would win, and also that he would buy if he knew the Democrat would 
win. ‘On the basis of’ the Sure-thing Principle, he decides that, despite not knowing who will 
win, he should buy. Savage says of this principle: ‘except possibly for the assumption of 
simple ordering [i.e., P1], I know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that 
finds such ready acceptance’ (1954: 21). Of course, this claim would be disputed by many 
modern theorists (and it had already been challenged by Allais when Savage was writing). 
But our concern here is with the role of the Sure-thing Principle in Savage’s reasoning, not 
with its normative force.   
 It is important to recognise that the Sure-thing Principle, as stated by Savage, is not 
the same thing as P2; rather, it serves as part of his justification of that axiom. One difference 
is that the Sure-thing Principle, unlike P2, is a principle of what decision theorists would now 
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call ‘event-wise dominance’. More importantly, and as Savage (1954: 22) notes explicitly, 
the Sure-thing Principle refers to two concepts that are not defined in terms of his primitives. 
 The first of these concepts is ‘knowing that’ some event obtains. To a careful reader 
of The Foundations of Statistics, it will become clear that ‘not preferring f to g, knowing that 
B obtains’ is the informal counterpart of the ternary relation f ≤ g given B that Savage (1954: 
22) defines within his formal system. But that definition depends on the assumption that P2 
holds,6 an assumption that Savage cannot make when using the Sure-thing Principle to 
explain or justify P2. The second such concept is that of an event regarded as ‘virtually 
impossible’. This also has a formal counterpart definable in Savage’s framework, namely a 
null event (which becomes a zero-probability event if preferences have an expected-utility 
representation). But once again the formal concept (here, null event) or its interpretation in 
terms of the informal concept (here, virtually impossible event) hinges on assuming P2. For 
Savage, the Sure-thing Principle is a pre-theoretic principle that is self-evident to ordinarily 
intelligent persons unfamiliar with decision theory. He describes it as ‘a loose [principle] that 
suggests certain formal postulates well articulated with [i.e., connected to] P1’ (1954: 22).  P2 
is one of the postulates suggested by this Principle. 
3. Savage’s initial response to Allais’s situations 
Savage (1954: 101–103) asks his readers to consider an example of two decision situations. 
Initially, he describes these situations as they were presented to him by Allais, but with prizes 
in US dollars.7  This presentation is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  The decision situations as presented by Allais 
Situation 1:  Choose between 
Gamble 1. $500,000 with probability 1; and 
Gamble 2. $2,500,000 with probability 0.1, 
  $500,000 with probability 0.89, 
                                                            
6 Here we are referring to the definition of f ≤ g given B in the main text of Foundations of Statistics. 
In the endpapers of that book, Savage gives an alternative and more complicated definition that is 
independent of P2; P2 is then stated as the condition that, for all f, g and B, either f ≤ g given B or g ≤ f 
given B. 
7 For approximate 2020 equivalents, multiply the dollar amounts by 10.  
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  status quo with probability 0.01. 
Situation 2:  Choose between 
Gamble 3. $500,000 with probability 0.11 
  status quo with probability 0.89; and 
Gamble 4. $2,500,000 with probability 0.1, 
  status quo with probability 0.9. 
 
 Savage conjectures that many of his readers will prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2 and 
prefer Gamble 4 to Gamble 3, and that, for almost everyone, there will be some variant of the 
example that will induce preferences of this kind. These were the preferences that he 
expressed when first shown the two situations, and he still feels an intuitive attraction to 
them. Savage offers a psychologically plausible explanation for this phenomenon: 
Many people prefer Gamble 1 to Gamble 2, because, speaking qualitatively, they 
do not find the chance of receiving a very large fortune in place of receiving a 
large fortune outright adequate compensation for even a small risk of being left in 
the status quo. Many of the same people prefer Gamble 4 to Gamble 3; because, 
speaking qualitatively, the chance of winning is nearly the same in both gambles, 
so the one with the much larger prize seems preferable. 
Table 2 is one way of representing this understanding of the two situations. The language in 
which chances and outcomes are described is imprecise, but it is natural and intuitive. 
 
Table 2:  Savage’s initial mental representation of the decision situations  
Situation 1: 
Gamble 1 
certain 
large prize 
Gamble 2 
unlikely likely very unlikely 
very large prize large prize status quo 
 
Situation 2: 
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Gamble 3 
unlikely likely 
large prize status quo 
Gamble 4 
unlikely likely 
very large prize status quo 
 
 The Allais Paradox preferences revealed by Savage are jointly inconsistent with 
SEUT. Savage demonstrates this fact algebraically, by treating the utilities of the three 
relevant consequences as unknown variables and showing that those preferences are not 
consistent with any combination of values of those variables. At this initial stage, he does not 
try to identify which of his axioms he has contravened, presumably because Allais presented 
the situations in a form that does not have a unique translation into the state/ consequence 
structure in which Savage’s axioms are formulated. Nevertheless, since those axioms jointly 
imply SEUT, the algebraic analysis is sufficient to establish that he has contravened at least 
one of them.   
 Savage finds it unsettling that his preferences are inconsistent with a theory that he 
has defended as normative: 
In general, a person who has tentatively accepted a normative theory must 
conscientiously study situations in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he 
must decide for each by reflection – deduction will typically be of little relevance 
– whether to retain his initial impression of the situation or to accept the 
implications of the theory for it. (1954: 102) 
Notice that, faced with the question of whether he personally accepts a normative implication 
of his theory, Savage switches from theoretical reasoning to ‘reflection’. As long as he is 
merely policing his decisions for consistency with a given set of axiomatic requirements, he 
has no need to engage in introspection: he needs only to observe his own decisions and to 
investigate their properties. But now he is asking whether he still accepts that his axioms are 
justified as requirements of rationality. He needs to switch to a mode of reasoning that can 
accommodate the pre-theoretic concepts that are invoked by the Sure-thing Principle. It is at 
this point in a reconstruction of Savage’s reasoning that a Broomean theoretical framework 
becomes useful. 
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4. A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 
Broome (2013) asks whether rationality requirements, such as those encapsulated in the 
axioms of decision theory, can be achieved by reasoning. He expresses surprise that many 
writers on rationality seem to assume that, if a person comes to believe that some specific 
principle is a requirement of rationality, she is thereby able to reason her way to satisfying 
that requirement. In questioning this assumption, he develops an account of a person’s 
‘mental states’, seen as intentional states (i.e., states that are directed towards something). 
Mental states are the basis of Broome’s concepts of both rationality and reasoning. We will 
now formalize the fundamental features of his approach following Dietrich et al. (2019), and 
explain why, for Broome, achieving rationality through reasoning is not straightforward.8 
 At any given time, an individual (in Broome’s language, ‘you’) has a set of mental 
states. A mental state is an attitude that you hold towards something (the content of that 
attitude). The simplest kind of mental state is a pair (p, a) where p, the content, is a 
proposition and a is an attitude type that it is possible to hold towards p. For example, (q, 
belief) is the mental state of believing that q is the case; (I do x, intention) is the mental state 
of intending to do x.9  There are also mental states whose attitude types are held towards 
ordered pairs of propositions. For example, (I get x, I get y, preference), which we abbreviate 
to (x, y, ≻), is the mental state of strictly preferring getting x to getting y; (I get x, I get y, 
indifference) or (x, y, ∼) is the mental state of being indifferent between getting x and getting 
y. 10 Formally, there is a set A of attitude types, such that each type a has a domain Da of 
objects (i.e., propositions that can feature in the content of that type of attitude) and a number 
na ≥ 1 of places (i.e., the number of objects that make up that content). For example, 
preference is a two-place attitude type whose domain is the set of possible I get … 
propositions. Let M be the set of all possible mental states, formally the set of all (x1, …, xn, 
a) such that a is an attitude type in A, n is a’s number of places, and x1, …, xn, are objects in 
                                                            
8 For brevity, we will not provide full textual support for the claim that this model is faithful to 
Broome’s intentions. For that, see Dietrich et al. (2019).  
9 The attitude type intention is important in a Broomean version of decision theory, because intentions 
are mental states that can cause deliberate action, and actions are not themselves mental states. In a 
Broomean model, there are requirements that link intentions to preferences, rather than requirements 
linking choices to preferences (Dietrich et al., 2019). 
10 In our model, the propositions that make up the content of a preference attitude refer to 
consequences of actions (‘I get x’), not to the actions themselves (e.g., ‘I do x’). This allows a better 
fit with Savage’s framework: a Savage ‘act’ is a description of the (state-conditional) consequences of 
taking some action (i.e., what you get if you take it). 
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the domain Da. At any given time, you have a set of mental states C ⊆ M, called a (mental) 
constitution. 
 A requirement is a condition on your constitution, and hence restricts the mental 
states that you can hold at the same time. Formally, it identifies a ‘permissible’ subset of the 
set 2M of all possible constitutions. Constitutions in this subset satisfy the requirement; the 
others violate it. Our concern is with requirements that are interpreted (perhaps by some 
particular theory) as requirements of rationality. An example is the principle that strict 
preferences are transitive. It can be written as a schema of rationality requirements: for any 
triple of options x, y, z, there is the requirement that [(x, y, ≻) ∈ C ∧ (y, z, ≻) ∈ C] ⇒ (x, z, 
≻) ∈ C. Here and elsewhere, we specify a requirement by stating a condition on the 
constitution, with the understanding that, formally, the requirement is the set of constitutions 
satisfying that condition.11 Notice that what is required is the conditional ‘If x is preferred to 
y and y is preferred to z, then x is preferred to z’. The ‘wide-scope’ statement that rationality 
requires the whole conditional is not equivalent to the ‘narrow-scope’ statement that if x is 
preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then rationality requires that x is preferred to z. Broome 
(2013: 31–34) argues that rationality requirements have wide scope. Although this general 
claim has been questioned (e.g., by Kolodny, 2005), it is uncontroversial that the rationality 
requirements found in decision theory have wide scope. 
 Rationality, as understood by Broome (2013: 152), ‘requires your mental states to be 
properly related to one another’. It has nothing to say about how mental states come into or 
go out of existence. In contrast, reasoning is a causal psychological process that can create 
new mental states. It is an activity under your conscious control. Thus, in terms of the System 
1/ System 2 distinction, reasoning is a System 2 operation. It is important to recognise that 
reasoning is not the only mental process that can create mental states; mental states can be 
created (and also eliminated) by the automatic psychological processes of System 1.  
 Broome (2013: 234) describes reasoning as ‘a rule-governed operation on the contents 
of your conscious attitudes’. Your mental experience of reasoning consists in calling to mind 
a set of premise-attitudes and then finding (in a way that can be expressed as ‘So …’) that 
some conclusion-attitude follows from them. In ‘calling an attitude to mind’, you bring its 
                                                            
11 A (less Broomean, but more classically choice-theoretic) alternative would have been to regard 
transitivity as a single rationality requirement that begins by a ‘for all’ quantification over triples of 
alternatives.   
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content into your conscious mind in a way that allows you to use it in reasoning (2013: 222–
224). The implication is that, at any given time, your conscious attitudes make up a subset of 
the (probably much larger) set of mental states that you have already formed and are capable 
of calling to mind.12 The latter set is your constitution.  The sense of ‘following from’ is that 
of (implicitly or explicitly) being guided by some rule, in a way that ‘seems right to you’ 
(2013: 237–8). For a mental process to be reasoning, it is not necessary that you are 
consciously aware of the rule you are following; your acceptance of the conclusion and your 
sense that it follows from the premises is ‘sufficient endorsement of the rule’, which does not 
require awareness of the rule, or indeed of the concept of a rule (2013: 233). It will be 
convenient to apply the concept of seeming right to rules whose individual applications seem 
right to you; but, strictly speaking, what seems right to you is the mental process and not the 
rule itself. Formally, a reasoning rule is a pair (P, m) where P ⊆ M is a set of premise mental 
states and m ∈ M is a conclusion mental state.13 (Analogously with our treatment of 
requirements, we sometimes use the term ‘rule’ as a shorthand for ‘schema of rules’, by 
treating P and m as variables or parameters of a schema.)  Intuitively, if the rule (P, m) seems 
right to you, and if all its premise states are already in your constitution, you can call to mind 
the contents of those states in a way that causes you to hold the mental state m. In calling 
these contents to mind, you are conscious of the attitudes that you hold towards those 
contents (otherwise, you could not have known that the rule you were using was applicable to 
the case), but your reasoning is about the contents of your attitudes, not about your attitudes. 
 For example, suppose the rule ({(x, y, ≻), (y, z, ≻)}, (x, z, ≻)) seems right to you, and 
that you already have the mental states (x, y, ≻) and (y, z, ≻). Then you can reason in a way 
that you can put into words as: ‘Rather x than y. Rather y than z. So, rather x than z’. 
Following Broome, in your internal language you use an expression like ‘Rather x than y’ to 
express in words the marked content of (x, y, ≻), i.e., the content (x, y) marked by the attitude 
type of preference. Similarly, you internally express the marked content of (x, y, ~) as ‘Just as 
well x as y’. The ‘rather-than’ and the ‘just-as-well-as’ are linguistic markers for preference 
                                                            
12 By this, we mean that each of these mental states is individually capable of being called to mind, 
not that any set of them can be called to mind simultaneously.  
13 We follow Dietrich et al. (2019) in defining a reasoning rule in terms of the mental states that 
supply you with premises and the mental state that you form by applying the rule. Broome (2013: 
267–287) prefers to define a reasoning rule in terms of the premises and conclusion themselves, 
which are marked contents rather than mental states. The two approaches are formally equivalent if, 
as we assume, there is a one-to-one relationship between mental states (i.e., attitudes as facts of 
psychology) and marked contents (i.e., your internal view of those attitudes). 
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and indifference, respectively. Beliefs are special mental states in that they need no linguistic 
marker: our internal language expresses the marked content of (It rains, belief) simply as ‘It 
rains’, without explicit linguistic marker. In that sense, belief is the default type of attitude. 
Following Broome, ‘Rather x than y’ is crucially distinct from ‘I prefer x to y’. The latter 
expresses the marked content of the second order mental state (I prefer x to y, belief).14  (A 
mental state of yours is second-order if its content refers to one or more of your own mental 
states.)  
 Since our paper is concerned with whether errors can be corrected by reasoning, it is 
important to consider the possibility of erroneous reasoning. Broome (2013: 232–234, 237–
240) distinguishes between two concepts of error in reasoning. The first concept applies when 
you have a ‘steady disposition’ for a certain rule to seem right to you, but you make a mistake 
in trying to follow it. For example, you might try to follow the rules of arithmetic in adding 
11,866 to 14,977, but make an arithmetic error. The mental process that leads to the 
conclusion ‘So, the sum is 26,853’ seems right to you at the time, and therefore counts as 
reasoning, but it involves a mistake according to your own standards of rightness. The second 
concept presupposes some universal or intersubjective standard by which reasoning rules can 
be categorised as correct or incorrect. For example, suppose you reason: ‘All Xs are Ys; this 
object is a Y; so, it is an X’. If you have a steady disposition for this kind of reasoning to seem 
right to you, you have not made the first type of mistake, but Broome would say that the rule 
you are following is incorrect (even though, in following it, you are reasoning). As we 
explained in Section 1, the concept of error used in behavioural welfare economics is defined 
in relation to the standards of the individual who is supposed to have made the error. We 
therefore focus on the first type of error.  
 We now have the resources to explain some of the difficulties involved in trying to 
reason from a belief in a rationality requirement to the satisfaction of that requirement. 
 The most obvious difficulty is that accepting a rationality requirement does not imply 
accepting a reasoning rule by which you can achieve that requirement. A reasoning rule may 
indeed be a means by which a rationality requirement can be achieved, but for that rule to be 
                                                            
14 This distinction highlights a distinctive feature of Broome’s model: it can represent reasoning in 
multiple attitudes (preference, indifference, intention, belief, and so on) as well as reasoning about 
such attitudes. Most formal models of reasoning are implicitly restricted to reasoning in beliefs; other 
attitudes appear only as the content of beliefs (e.g., the belief that I prefer x to y, or the belief that I 
ought to intend z). 
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a rule for you – and thereby to be a rule that you can use – it must seem right to you. That is, 
the ‘So…’ that links the premise attitudes to the conclusion attitude must correspond with a 
genuine subjective sense that the conclusion follows from the premise. Believing that a rule is 
a means to some desirable end does not necessarily make the rule seem right. More 
fundamentally, there is nothing in Broome’s model that allows you to reason towards having 
any specific rule r. Since ‘r is a rule for me’ expresses a proposition, it cannot be a mental 
state in itself; it can only be the content of some mental state, such as belief or intention. 
Believing or intending that r is a rule for you is not the same thing as the rule seeming right to 
you. 
 One way of overcoming this difficulty might be to assume that you have some general 
second-order enkratic rule (strictly, a schema of such rules) that allows you to reason directly 
from the belief in the requirement to have a certain mental state to the intention to have it. For 
example, you might have the rule ({(it is a requirement of rationality that m is in my 
constitution, belief)}, (m is in my constitution, intention)) where m is any mental state. But 
this gives rise to two new problems. First, the requirements of decision theory typically have 
an If …, then … structure; they do not pick out individual mental states that you are 
unconditionally required to have. Second, having a certain mental state m arguably can be the 
content of an intention only if there is some psychological mechanism by which you can 
bring about m by a conscious mental act. For many attitude types, there is no direct 
mechanism of this kind. Broome (2013: 212–213) argues that this is no such mechanism for 
beliefs: ‘you cannot directly bring yourself to believe p by intending to believe p’. Whether 
the same is true for preferences is less clear. Broome’s (2006) inclination is to think there is 
no direct mechanism if preferences are interpreted as beliefs about betterness (the 
interpretation he favours) or as comparative desires. However, he also considers (but 
dismisses as ‘artificial’) a concept of ‘broad preference’, according to which to prefer x to y is 
to be in a mental state that would typically cause you to choose x if the only available options 
were x and y. Arguably, this concept is compatible with Savage’s behaviouristic 
interpretation of preference. Broome suggests that because some kinds of broad preference 
are intentions, it may be possible to reason directly from a belief that some broad preference 
is rationally required towards having that preference.     
 It is significant that the foregoing arguments are about directly bringing yourself to 
have particular mental states. Broome (2013: 213) recognises that in some circumstances you 
may be able to deliberately activate psychological mechanisms that will then cause you to 
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form certain attitudes, but notes that such indirect processes are not reasoning. His examples 
of indirect processes are (in his words) ‘exotic’ – ‘enlisting the help of a hypnotist’, 
‘undertaking a programme of self-persuasion’, and ‘in science fiction, [taking] a pill’. But 
there are everyday examples too. If you choose to browse in an up-market department store 
rather than a discount supermarket, you will expose yourself to psychological cues that 
activate desires for luxury goods. We will say more about such indirect processes later. 
 Yet another difficulty is that rationality requirements can have a different If … then 
… structure: one in which either the antecedent or the consequent (or both) is a proposition 
about the absence of mental states. For example, [(x, y, f ) ∉ C ∧ (x, y, ~) ∉ C] ⇒ (y, x, ≻) ∈ 
C is a requirement of completeness of preferences, and [(x, y, ≻) ∈ C ∧ (y, z, ≻) ∈ C] ⇒ (z, 
x, ≻) ∉ C is a requirement of acyclicity of preference. But reasoning, as represented by 
Broome, cannot start from premises about the absence of mental states, nor can it end with a 
conclusion about such an absence. In Dietrich et al.’s (2019) terminology, P2 and the Sure-
thing Principle are closedness requirements (prescribing presences of mental states given 
presences of mental states), preference completeness is a completeness requirement 
(prescribing presences given absences), and preference acyclicity is a consistency 
requirement (prescribing absences given presences).15 Broome (2013: 279–280) recognises 
that, although consistency requirements are essential to theories of rationality, they cannot be 
achieved by explicit reasoning.16 He argues that they are normally achieved by automatic 
psychological processes, but says little about what those processes might be. Sections 5 and 6 
discuss this issue.   
5. A Broomean representation of Savage’s ‘reflections’  
Our objective in this section is to reconstruct the mental process by which Savage arrived at 
preferences over Allais’s situations that were consistent with P2, and to assess this in the light 
                                                            
15 More precisely, P2, the Sure-thing Principle, preference completeness and preference acyclicity are 
schemas of closedness, completeness and consistency requirements, respectively. For instance, 
preference acyclicity contains a separate consistency requirement for each triple of options x, y, z. 
16 Following Dietrich et al. (2019), a reasoning rule r (respectively: a set S of reasoning rules) 
achieves a rationality requirement R if the following is true for every constitution C: starting from C, 
application of r (respectively: repeated application of rules from S) produces a constitution C′ that 
satisfies R. Dietrich et al. derive an almost equally negative result about the possibility of achieving 
completeness requirements by reasoning, but show that all closedness requirements are achievable by 
reasoning. 
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of Broome’s catalogue of the difficulties of achieving rationality through reasoning. We first 
give representations (within Dietrich et al.’s Broomean framework) of the mental states, 
rationality requirements and reasoning rules that feature in Savage’s argument. Recall from 
Section 3 that, viewed in relation to Savage’s formal decision theory, the reasoning that we 
need to reconstruct is pre-theoretic and introspective. For our purposes, it is sufficient to 
represent those concepts that are relevant to that reasoning. 
 We can define states of the world, events, consequences and acts as in Savage’s 
theory. It would be natural to represent Savage’s concepts of preference and indifference 
between acts as attitude types in A, as in Section 4. However, our reconstruction of Savage’s 
pre-theoretic reasoning requires some other attitudes. Specifically, we need to represent two 
concepts that are not among Savage’s formal primitives – ‘is not virtually impossible’ and 
‘preferring … knowing that …’ (see Section 2 above). It turns out to be convenient to 
represent ordinary preference and indifference using the second of these concepts.  
 The first concept is simpler to deal with. We define an attitude type of partial belief, 
using that term as a shorthand for ‘belief that is at least partial’. The domain of this attitude 
type is the set of propositions of the form ‘E obtains’ (which we abbreviate to ‘E’), where E 
is an event. The marked content of (E, partial belief) is expressed by ‘Maybe E’. This is our 
first-order Broomean representation of the attitude that Savage expresses as ‘not regarding E 
as virtually impossible’. 
 The second concept is more difficult, because its intended meaning is not immediately 
obvious. Take the case of the businessman who would prefer buying (f) to not buying (g) if 
he knew that the Republican would win an election that has yet to take place. It is clear that 
this is a preference held at a time when the businessman does not know the election result: it 
is not a second-order belief about what he will prefer at a future date, if and when he knows 
that the Republican has won. It is not the material conditional ‘If I know the Republican will 
win, then I prefer f to g’, since the antecedent of that conditional is false. But nor is it the 
counterfactual conditional ‘Were I to know that the Republican would win, I would prefer f to 
g’. Knowing the result of an election before it takes place is a peculiar counterfactual. (The 
closest possible world with this property might be one in which the businessman is a party to 
the rigging of a Presidential election, and in which his attitude to buying property could be 
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very different.17) We suggest that Savage’s intention is best represented in terms of a 
primitive first-order attitude that can be expressed as ‘On the assumption that the Republican 
will win, I prefer f to g’.  
 We formalise this idea using two further attitude types. For each event E ⊆ Ω, we 
define the two-place attitude types E-conditional preference, denoted f E, and E-conditional 
indifference, denoted ~E. The domain of each of these attitude types is the set of propositions 
of the form ‘I get f’(which we abbreviate to ‘f’) where f is an act. The mental state (f, g, ≻E) is 
the attitude of strictly preferring f to g, on the assumption that E obtains. The marked content 
of this attitude is expressed by ‘Assuming E, rather f than g’. The mental state (f, g, ~E) is the 
attitude of being indifferent between f and g, on the assumption that E obtains; its marked 
content is expressed by ‘Assuming E, just as well f as g’. Ordinary preference and 
indifference between acts are identified with preference and indifference given the 
tautological event Ω, i.e., f Ω and ~Ω, respectively. The marked contents of (f, g, ≻Ω) and (f, 
g, ~Ω) can be expressed simply as ‘Rather f than g’ and ‘Just as well f as g’. For example, 
consider Savage’s businessman. Let E be the event that the election is won by the 
Republican. According to Savage, the businessman has the initial mental states (f, g, ≻E) and 
(f, g, ≻Ω\E), and forms the new mental state (f, g, ≻Ω). 
 Why do we use two attitude types to express ordinary preference and indifference, 
rather than a single attitude type that corresponds with weak preference (as in standard 
decision theory) or with Savage’s formal relation ≤? Reducing preference and indifference to 
either of those single relations would be mathematically convenient, but the resulting relation 
would not correspond with a psychologically natural attitude. That would be inappropriate for 
a model of introspective reasoning. Savage (1954: 17) hints at this thought when he says that, 
for the purposes of a ‘postulational treatment of the relationships of preference and 
indifference’, using the relation ≤ is ‘technically convenient’. 
 For our reconstruction of Savage’s response to Allais, the only rationality 
requirements we need to consider are instances of the following schemas, whose variables are 
two acts and an event, respectively denoted f, g and E (despite the fixed meanings we 
sometimes give to these symbols): 
                                                            
17 Here we are following Lewis’s (1973) analysis of counterfactuals in terms of similarity relations 
between ‘possible worlds’. 
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Asymmetry of preference (AP): (f, g, ≻E) ∈ C ⇒ (g, f, ≻E) ∉ C. 
Sure-thing Principle (for combining preference and indifference) (STP): [(f, g, ≻E) 
∈ C ∧ (f, g, ~Ω\E) ∈ C ∧ (E, partial belief) ∈ C] ⇒ (f, g, ≻Ω) ∈ C. 
AP is a schema of consistency requirements; STP is a schema of closeness requirements. We 
take these requirements to be ones that Savage believes to be self-evident to ordinarily 
intelligent persons.18 It might be objected that AP is a conceptual necessity rather than a 
rationality requirement. Indeed, Savage (1954:17) argues that in his formal theory ‘the very 
meaning’ of preference in terms of pairwise choice implies that a person cannot 
simultaneously prefer f to g and g to f. But remember that we are now reconstructing 
Savage’s pre-theoretic and introspective concept of preference: what is at issue is what counts 
as order in the mind. Arguably, it is not psychologically possible for two directly 
contradictory mental states such as (f, g, ≻E) and (g, f, ≻E) to be in your conscious mind 
simultaneously. But it seems entirely possible for your constitution to contain two such 
mental states. 
 The only reasoning rules we need to consider are instances of the following schema, 
which has as variables two acts and an event, denoted by f, g and E (despite the fixed 
meanings of f, g and E elsewhere):  
Sure-thing Rule (for combining preference and indifference): ({(f, g, ≻E), (f, g, ~Ω\E), 
(E, partial belief)}, (f, g, ≻Ω)). 
Notice that to every instance of the rationality requirement STP, there corresponds an 
instance of the Sure-thing Rule that achieves it.19 It is surely uncontroversial that these rules 
seem right to Savage, and hence can be used by him. 
 How did Savage reason? Savage (1954: 103) tells us that, upon reflection, he has 
‘accepted the following way of looking at the two situations, which amounts to repeated use 
of the sure-thing principle’.20 He explains this way of looking by saying that ‘one way in 
                                                            
18 They are not the only requirements with this status. Others include symmetry of indifference, 
incompatibility between preference and indifference, the Sure-thing Principle for combining 
preference and preference, the Sure-thing Principle for combining indifference and indifference, and 
various transitivity conditions for preference and indifference. 
19 This correspondence is closely related to the formal result about achieving closedness requirements 
referenced in footnote 16. 
20 As Savage does not make an explicit distinction between rationality requirements and reasoning 
rules, it is difficult to assess whether, in ‘looking at’ the situations, what is to be repeatedly used is the 
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which Gambles 1–4 could be realized’ is by a lottery with 100 tickets and the prizes specified 
in Table 3. (We have added the notation f, g, f ′ and g′ for Gambles 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.) 
The claim that this lottery implements exactly the gambles in Allais’s situations depends on 
the unproblematic assumption that each of the 100 tickets has the same subjective probability 
of being drawn. We will call this representation of the gambles the state/consequence frame. 
 
Table 3:  The decision situations as finally represented by Savage 
              Ticket number 
    1  2–11  12–100 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Situation 1:  Gamble 1 (f) $500,000 $500,000 $500,000 
           Gamble 2 (g) $0  $2,500,000 $500,000 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Situation 2:  Gamble 3 (f ′) $500,000 $500,000 $0 
           Gamble 4 (g′) $0  $2,500,000 $0 
_____________________________________________________________ 
  
 Table 3 reveals the theoretical relationship between the Allais Paradox and Savage’s 
P2 axiom. The table can be read as a matrix in which rows represent acts, columns represent 
states, and cells contain consequences. Let Ω = {1, …, 100} be the set of states, defined by 
which ticket number is drawn, and define the event E = {1, …, 11}. Table 3 tells us that in E, 
f agrees with f ′, and g agrees with g′, while in Ω \E, f agrees with g, and f ′ agrees with g′. 
According to P2, f ≤ g ⇔ f ′ ≤ g′ in Savage’s notation, and hence (f, g, ≻Ω) ∈ C ⇔ (f′, g′, ≻Ω) 
∈ C in ours. Thus, Savage’s initial preferences violate P2. This conclusion gives a more 
precise identification of how those preferences contravene Savage’s theory, but he still has to 
decide whether to reject P2 or change his preferences. 
 Savage’s reasoning within the state/consequence frame is as follows (we have 
separated this quotation into numbered passages for easier reference): 
[1] Now, if one of the tickets numbered from 12 through 100 is drawn, it will not 
matter, in either situation, which gamble I choose. [2] I therefore focus on the 
possibility that one of the tickets numbered from 1 through 11 will be drawn, in 
which case Situations 1 and 2 are exactly parallel. [3] The subsidiary decision 
                                                            
Sure-thing Principle as a rationality requirement, a corresponding reasoning rule, or some 
combination of the two. We try to clarify this in our reconstruction.    
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depends in both situations on whether I would sell an outright gift of $500,000 for 
a 10-to-1 chance to win $2,500,000 – a conclusion that I think has a claim to 
universality, or objectivity. [4] Finally, consulting my purely personal taste, I find 
that I would prefer the gift of $500,000 [5] and, accordingly, that I prefer Gamble 
1 to Gamble 2 and (contrary to my initial reaction) Gamble 3 to Gamble 4. (1954: 
103) 
 Table 4 represents Savage’s new understanding of the decision problems, expressed in 
the kind of intuitive language we used in Table 2. On this new description, the two decision 
problems coincide; the description suppresses the difference.21 The asterisk is a placeholder 
for ‘whatever happens, assuming one of tickets 12–100 is drawn’, which (within a given 
situation) is the same for both options. The relevant choice is about what happens, assuming 
one of tickets 1–11 is drawn. 
 
Table 4:  Savage’s final mental representation of both decision situations  
Choose between: 
Gamble 1/Gamble 3 
          ticket 1,…, 11 drawn                   ticket 12, …, 100 drawn 
certain  
* large prize 
 
Gamble 2/ Gamble 4 
       ticket 1,…, 11 drawn                   ticket 12, …, 100 drawn 
likely unlikely  
* very large prize status quo 
 
 We reconstruct Savage’s reasoning as a four-stage process, focusing on his reasoning 
about f′ and g′ (the acts for which he ‘corrects’ his preference). 
                                                            
21 In terms of Dietrich and List’s (2016) reason-based model, in the new frame the acts f and f’ have 
the same salient properties, as do g and g’, whereas in the old frame the salient properties differ. 
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 Stage 1 (carry-over of automatic processing in the probability distribution frame). 
Responding to Allais’s situations, when presented as in Table 1 (the probability distribution 
frame), Savage formed attitudes of strict preference for Gamble 1 over Gamble 2, and for 
Gamble 4 over Gamble 3. We are told that these mental states were formed as ‘immediate 
express[ions]’ of preference, based on ‘intuitive attraction’ (Savage, 1954: 103). We interpret 
this as System 1 mental processing, activated by the cues of the probability distribution 
framing.22 Since Savage sees f, g, f ′ and g′ as realisations of Gambles 1, 2, 3 and 4 
respectively, he brings these initial preferences to the new frame. At this stage, his 
constitution takes the form 
 C = {(f, g, ≻Ω), (g′, f′, ≻Ω),   …}, 
where ‘…’ stands for other attitudes, including preferences relative to other acts, beliefs, 
intentions, etc. 
 Stage 2 (automatic processing in the state/consequence frame). In ‘focusing on the 
possibility that’ one of the tickets 1–11 is drawn (event E), he engages in conditional 
considerations. Assuming E, f gives $500,000 for sure, while g gives $2,500,000 with a ten-
to-one chance. Consulting his ‘purely personal taste’, he finds that, assuming E, he prefers 
f′to g′ (passage [4]): he comes to have the attitude (f′, g′, ≻E). This attitude is not produced by 
conscious reasoning; it can be conceptualised as an outcome of the automatic processes of 
System 1, acting on the cues provided by the state/consequence framing. Assuming instead 
that one of the last eighty-nine tickets is drawn (event Ω \E), he realises that the acts f′ and g′ 
yield the same payoff ($500,000), and finds himself having a conditional indifference, 
formally the mental state (f′, g′, ~Ω\E). Recognising that E is a real possibility, he also forms 
the attitude (E, partial belief). As the mental states (f′, g′, ~Ω\E) and (E, partial belief) are so 
natural, we treat them as System 1 outputs. But they might instead have been generated 
through reasoning from more basic attitudes.23 Savage’s constitution now takes the form: 
                                                            
22 This is our understanding of how Savage came to have these preferences. The existence of non-
standard rational choice theories that explain the common consequence effect (e.g., Allais 1979) 
suggests that other people might come to the same preferences by processes in which System 1 
operations are supplemented by explicit reasoning. 
23 One might specify a rationality requirement of being conditionally indifferent between acts believed 
to conditionally agree, and a corresponding reasoning rule by which Savage could reason from (f′ 
agrees with g′ in Ω\E, belief) towards the state (f, g, ~Ω \E). Using an attitude type of equally strong 
belief, one might specify rules by which Savage could reason from the symmetry of the 100 single-
state events towards equally strong belief in each of them, and from that towards (E, partial belief).   
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 C = {(f, g, ≻Ω), (g′, f′, ≻Ω), (f′, g′, ≻E), (f′, g′, ~Ω\E), (E, partial belief), …}. 
 Stage 3 (reasoning). In our reconstruction of passage [5], Savage uses the Sure-thing 
Rule to reason from {(f′, g′, ≻E), (f′, g′, ~Ω\E), (E, partial belief)} to (f′, g′, ≻Ω). Spelt out 
using marked contents, here is his reasoning: 
 Assuming E, rather f′ than g′. 
 Assuming not E, just as well f′ as g′. 
 Maybe E. 
 So, rather f′ than g′. 
Savage’s constitution now takes the form: 
C = {(f, g, ≻Ω), (g′, f′, ≻Ω), (f′, g′, ≻E), (f′, g′, ~Ω\E), (E, partial belief), ≻Ω), (f′, g′, 
≻Ω), …}. 
Stages 2 to 3 can be repeated for f and g. Stage 2 would add (f, g, ≻E) and (f, g, ~Ω\E) to 
Savage’s constitution and ‘confirm’ (i.e., repeat the formation of) (E, partial belief), ≻Ω). 
Stage 3 would confirm (f, g, ≻Ω). Savage’s constitution now satisfies the relevant instances of 
STP. 
 Stage 4 (Disappearance of an attitude). If, as our reconstruction assumes, Savage’s 
constitution still contains his original preference (g′, f ′, ≻Ω), that constitution now violates an 
instance of the rationality requirement AP. Recall that in his account of his reasoning, Savage 
describes his reaching the conclusion (f ′, g′, ≻Ω) as ‘reversing my preference between 
Gambles 3 and 4’; but the reversal of the original preference requires the extinction of a 
mental state as well as the formation of a replacement. In a Broomean model, reasoning 
cannot eliminate any mental state. By what process does (g′, f ′, ≻Ω) disappear? 
 Savage answers an analogous question early in The Foundations of Statistics. He is 
responding to an imagined critic who challenges the analogy between his axioms and 
principles of logic (see Section 2 above). Savage concedes that he cannot ‘controvert’ the 
critic; he can only offer introspection: 
I would, in particular, tell him that, when it is explicitly brought to my attention 
that I have shown a preference for f as compared with g, for g as compared with h, 
and for h as compared with f, I feel uncomfortable in much the same way as when 
it is brought to my attention that some of my beliefs are logically contradictory. 
Whenever I examine such a triple of preferences on my own part, I find that it is 
28 
 
not at all difficult to reverse one of them. In fact, I find on contemplating the three 
alleged preferences side by side that at least one of them is not a preference at all, 
at any rate not any more.’  (1954: 21)  
In the Allais Paradox case, it comes to Savage’s attention that he has arrived at a preference 
for g′ over f′(in Stage 1) and at a preference for f′ over g′ (in Stage 3). It is natural to suppose 
that he would feel at least as uncomfortable about this anomaly as about the anomaly in the 
cited passage, and that the nature of the discomfort would be much the same. We therefore 
assume that Savage’s responses to the two cases are similar. That is, on contemplating the 
preferences (f ′, g ′, ≻Ω) and (g′, f ′, ≻Ω) side by side, he finds that (g′, f ′, ≻Ω) is not really or 
no longer a preference. The absence of this preference is not the conclusion of explicit 
reasoning; it is the result of an automatic mental process. As a conscious agent, Savage 
merely observes that a preference has disappeared.24 
 One might ask why, as a matter of empirical psychology, the preference that 
disappears is (g′, f ′, ≻Ω) and not (f ′, g ′, ≻Ω). We will return to this question in Section 6. For 
the moment, it is sufficient to note the implausibility of assuming that the relevant difference 
between the two preferences is that (f ′, g ′, ≻Ω) was formed as the conclusion of a reasoning 
rule, while (g′, f ′, ≻Ω) was an output of automatic processing. The conclusion of a reasoning 
rule is no more secure than the premises from which it was derived, and (f′, g′, ≻Ω) was 
derived from premises that included the automatically-produced (f′, g′, ≻E).  
   We can now answer the first main question addressed by our paper: Is Savage’s 
response to Allais’s challenge vulnerable to Broome’s critique?  Our answer is ‘No’. Taken 
altogether, Savage’s account is remarkably consistent with Broome’s account of reasoning 
towards rationality. We emphasize three points of convergence. 
First, unlike the ‘writers on rationality’ that Broome criticises, Savage does not think 
he has finished his job when he has justified P2 as a requirement of rationality: he also makes 
a serious attempt to explain how someone might come to satisfy that requirement. 
Second, Savage does not reason from the belief that either P2 or the Sure-thing 
Principle is justified. His reasoning at the crucial Stage 3 is first-order, using a reasoning rule 
                                                            
24 On an alternative reconstruction of Savage’s reasoning, his automatically-created preference for 
Gamble 4 over Gamble 3 is not ‘refreshed’ when he is thinking in the state/consequence frame, and so 
might disappear even before (f ′, g′, f Ω) is formed. Our conclusions do not depend on when the 
‘erroneous’ preference disappears. 
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(the Sure-thing Rule) rather than referring to a rationality requirement. And, as Broome finds 
important, this rule seems right to Savage, just as it will seem right to many readers of The 
Foundations of Statistics. 
 Third, Savage does not explain the disappearance of attitudes through explicit 
reasoning, in line with Broome’s rejection of reasoning towards absences. In particular, he 
does not claim that preferences can disappear by reasoning from the belief that preferences 
should be consistent (which would be second-order reasoning). Instead, automatic processes 
extinguish preferences, or perhaps fail to refresh them and so allow their decay. 
6. Did Savage correct an error? 
We now turn to our second main question: Does Savage’s mode of reasoning show the 
legitimacy of the concept of error-correction that is used in behavioural economics? We 
begin by asking what Savage means when he says that his reasoning corrects an error in his 
initial preferences.  
 Savage admits ambivalence about this claim. Concluding his discussion of Allais’s 
situations, he says: 
It seems to me that in reversing my preference between Gambles 3 and 4 I have 
corrected an error. There is, of course, an important sense in which preferences, 
being entirely subjective, cannot be in error; but in a different, more subtle sense 
they can be. (1954: 103) 
His only explanation of this sense is the following example: 
Let me illustrate with a simple example containing no reference to uncertainty. A 
man buying a car for $2,134.56 is tempted to order it with a radio installed, which 
will bring the total price to $2,228.41, feeling that the difference is trifling. But, 
when he reflects that, if he already had the car, he certainly would not spend 
$93.85 for a radio for it, he realizes that he has made an error. (1954: 103) 
Notice that what Savage is calling an ‘error’ is the man’s initial inclination to pay $93.95 for 
the radio, not the inconsistency between his preference for buying the radio as an optional 
extra and his preference for not buying it as a stand-alone purchase. Similarly, the ‘error’ that 
Savage corrects when he reflects on Allais’s situations is that of preferring Gamble 4 to 
Gamble 3, not his violation of P2. Of course, Savage views that violation as irrational (as, 
presumably, he views the inconsistency in the car-buyer’s preferences); but he achieves 
rationality by correcting a specific preference. 
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 The anomalous preferences of the man buying the car are indeed analogous with the 
Allais Paradox, but this example does not take us much further in understanding what Savage 
means by ‘error’.  Plausibly, both anomalies reflect the psychological mechanism of 
diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If you are thinking about the 
possibility of missing out on a large fortune, the difference between probabilities of 0.90 and 
0.89 seems less significant than the difference between 0.01 and zero. The probability 
distribution framing of the choice between Gambles 3 and 4 prompts you to compare 0.90 
and 0.89; the state/consequence framing prompts you to compare 0.01 and zero. Similarly, if 
you are thinking about buying a car radio, the difference between spending $2,228.41 and 
spending $2,135.56 seems less significant than the difference between spending $93.95 and 
spending nothing. If the radio is framed as an optional extra, you are prompted to make the 
first comparison; if it is framed as a stand-alone purchase, you are prompted to make the 
second. But in neither case does Savage explain what makes one comparison erroneous and 
the other correct.25  
 Nevertheless, it seems clear that, in some psychologically meaningful sense of the 
term, Savage endorses the preference that he calls correct, (f′, g′, ≻Ω), and not the one that he 
calls an error, (g′, f′, ≻Ω). He is telling us that, having reflected on the matter, he now 
approves of or identifies with the preference for Gamble 3 over Gamble 4, even when he is 
thinking about Allais’s situations in the probability distribution frame and even when his 
System 1 is reacting to that frame by producing a preference for Gamble 4 (the ‘intuitive 
attraction’).  How this idea is best represented in a Broomean framework is a difficult 
question. There is perhaps a parallel with Broome’s concept of your ‘endorsement’ of a 
conclusion reached by following a reasoning rule, as discussed in Section 4. Each of these 
concepts involves some sense of ‘seeming right to you’. In principle, each might be 
understood as an intentional attitude than you can hold towards a preference (in one case) or 
the reaching of a conclusion (in the other). It is notable, however, that Broome never treats a 
seeming-right attitude either as a premise of, or as the conclusion of, a reasoning rule. 
Similarly, in our reconstruction of Savage’s reasoning, the attitude of preference-endorsement 
                                                            
25 Savage’s intuition seems to be that, in the car radio case, diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses 
of money is an expression of under-sensitivity at relatively large money amounts. But an opposite 
intuition (i.e., over-sensitivity at relatively small amounts) is often invoked in explaining the very high 
degrees of risk aversion found in experiments investigating preferences over small-stake lotteries 
(e.g., Rabin, 2000). On a fully subjectivist view, diminishing sensitivity is an operational concept, but 
under- and over-sensitivity are not.     
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does not feature in any reasoning rule used by Savage. Its role is at Stage 4, at which 
automatic processes cause one of Savage’s preferences to disappear.   
 How this concept of endorsement relates to ‘correctness’ depends in part on how 
preference is interpreted. Under a cognitivist interpretation, favoured by Broome, a 
preference is a ‘better for me’ judgement, where ‘better for Savage’ is a property about which 
judgements can be true or false. This betterness property could be regarded as objective 
(which is probably Broome’s position) or as subjective, i.e., defined by what Savage 
approves or, more plausibly, would approve under ideal conditions of, say, awareness, 
information, and self-control. Under an emotivist interpretation, in contrast, a preference is a 
relative desire. On this view, ‘Rather x than y’ directly expresses an attitude of relative desire 
(not a second-order belief about the desires one has); the attitude itself is not something that 
can be true or false.26 Arguably, Broome’s concept of ‘broad preference’ as a mental state 
that can cause choice (discussed in Section 4 above) is compatible with either the cognitive or 
the emotive interpretation of preference. Any of these interpretations, and a range of subtly 
different variants of these, could support a coherent account of what Savage means by saying 
that (g′, f′, ≻Ω) was an error and that (f′, g′, ≻Ω) was a correction. The cognitivist 
interpretation, particularly its objectivist variant, would support a more literal reading of 
‘error’, but ‘making an error’ might be read simply as ‘forming a preference that I do not 
identify with’.27 For our purposes in this paper, it is sufficient to note that Savage believes 
that (g′, f′, ≻Ω) was an error by his own standards. In this respect, at least, Savage’s 
understanding of error is compatible with the analyses of error that are used in behavioural 
welfare economics. 
 But recall from Section 1 that, in behavioural welfare economics, an individual’s 
latent preferences are identified by abstracting from the effects of known sources of error on 
observable choice behaviour. If one is to show that Savage’s response to Allais’s challenge 
supports the methods of behavioural welfare economics, it is not enough to point out that, as 
a result of his reasoning, Savage has corrected what he judges to be an error and has arrived 
at a preference that is reflectively stable (i.e., that he acts on irrespective of how decision 
problems are framed). That might justify a behavioural welfare economist in concluding that 
                                                            
26 Sugden (2006) attributes this interpretation of preference to Hume (1739-40/ 1978), and presents 
Hume as a pioneer of experimental psychology. 
27 Relatedly, the idea that a requirement is one of ‘rationality’, and the idea that a rule ‘seems right to 
you’, are open to alternative interpretations according to how preferences are understood.  
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(f′, g′, ≻Ω) is Savage’s latent preference; but it would not show that Savage’s mode of 
reasoning can lead people in general to reflectively stable preferences that satisfy the axioms 
of rational choice theory. One needs to find some factor that was at work in Savage’s 
formation of (g′, f′, ≻Ω), that can be judged to be an error according to standards that almost 
everyone accepts, and that Savage’s reasoning corrected.  Were one to find an error of this 
kind, one might have some reason to expect that if a person became aware of having made it, 
a preference that she formed to correct it would have reflective stability. 
 But was there such an error in Savage’s formation of (g′, f′, ≻Ω)?  Clearly, there was 
no error of incorrect reasoning in either of Broome’s senses: (g′, f′, ≻Ω) was a direct output of 
System 1. Nor was there any failure of self-control: nothing in Savage’s account suggests 
that, when he expressed his initial preference for Gamble 4 over Gamble 3, he acted against 
what at the time he recognised as his better judgement. 
 Did Savage ‘incorrectly perceive the choice set’, i.e., make a mistake about the nature 
of Gambles 3 and 4, perhaps as a result of inattention or some cognitive limitation? Notice 
that the probability distribution framing is explicit and transparent about the possible 
consequences of each gamble, expressed as amounts of money, and about the probabilities of 
those consequences, expressed numerically. Nothing in Savage’s account suggests that he 
misperceived this simple information. Was there anything else he needed to know? 
According to Savage’s SEUT, an individual’s preferences between any two acts depend only 
on their respective consequences and probabilities. In particular, those preferences are 
independent of the juxtaposition of consequences that is revealed in the state/consequence 
framing. (For example, Table 3 is constructed in such a way that the states in which Gamble 
3 gives zero are also ones in which Gamble 4 gives zero.) Indeed, it is only because Savage 
treats this property of independence as self-evident that he is able to treat the particular 
juxtaposition in Table 3 as a realisation of Allais’s situations.28 We conclude that Savage 
acted on full information about each of the options in the relevant choice set.  
 What might be said is that the probability distribution framing fails to make salient 
certain kinds of relationship between objects within the choice set and objects outside it. In 
particular, it does not draw attention to the relationship between, on the one hand, an 
unconditional comparison between the available acts f′ and g′, and on the other, a comparison 
                                                            
28 Juxtaposition is relevant for some theories of choice under uncertainty, such as regret theory 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982), but its irrelevance is an implication of Savage’s axioms. 
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between the same two acts assuming E. Savage’s initial failure to notice that relationship 
might perhaps be called ‘inattention’ or ‘cognitive limitation’. For the sake of the argument, 
let us accept that this was an error by Savage. 
 But that is just another way of saying what has been implicit from the beginning: 
Savage believes that his reflective response to Allais’s challenge describes a sequence of 
mental operations that he could have carried out in the Paris lunch break. Presumably, he now 
believes that not carrying them out was an error or oversight. If he had carried them out, he 
would have found that his System 1 created the conditional preference (f′, g′, ≻E) in addition 
to (g′, f′, ≻Ω). (If he failed to notice the latter preference as an immediate effect of Allais’s 
framing, that would be inattention too.)  But that does not get us any nearer to finding what 
we are looking for – a factor that is an error in the sense that is recognised by behavioural 
welfare economists, and that contributed to the formation of the preference that Savage 
judges to be erroneous.  
 If we consider the psychological processes by which these preferences were formed, 
the essential difference between (f′, g′, ≻E) and (g′, f′, ≻Ω) is surely that they were formed in 
different frames. As Savage recognises, his formation of the preference (g′, f′, ≻Ω) was a 
natural – perhaps even a reasonable – response to the cues given by the probability 
distribution frame. It seems that, as viewed by Savage, the mistake he made in the lunch 
break was to think of Allais’s situations in that frame, rather than the state/consequence frame 
that he used in his later reflections. Ultimately, Savage endorses the preference (f′, g′, ≻Ω) 
because he approves of the frame in which it is formed.  
 It is easy to understand why Savage privileges the state/consequence frame, 
particularly when he is asking himself whether his axioms are justified. He has developed a 
conceptual framework in which preferences are defined in relation to the acts × states 
matrices of consequences that feature in that frame. In contrast, the concept of probability 
that is central to the probability distribution frame is not a primitive; it is a property of the 
SEUT representation of preferences that is implied by his axioms. Thus, the 
state/consequence frame is a better representation of what, according to Savage’s theory, is 
fundamental to choice under uncertainty. It is therefore neither surprising nor unreasonable 
that Savage feels particular identification with preferences that he has found or formed when 
thinking about problems in that frame.  
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 In choosing to use the state/consequence frame in responding to Allais’s challenge, 
Savage is deliberately affecting the cues on which his System 1 will work, in something like 
the way that a person with a tight budget might choose to avoid going into a high-end 
department store. Savage’s conscious mental activity is that of ‘focusing’ on – directing his 
attention to – a frame that he has chosen to use. Thus, System 1 and System 2 are playing 
complementary roles. Savage is conscious of the operations of both systems and of the 
relationships between them, even though only System 2 is under his conscious control. 
 We conclude that Savage’s concepts of error and correction are very different from 
those that behavioural welfare economists use to identify individuals’ latent preferences. 
Thus, the fact that Savage is able to correct what he classifies as an error gives no support to 
the error-correction methods of behavioural welfare economics. To the contrary, his account 
describes a pair of initial preferences, i.e., (f, g, ≻Ω) and (g′, f′, ≻Ω), that have not been 
influenced by what behavioural welfare economists classify as error, but which together 
violate a rationality requirement of SEUT. This is an anomaly that the methods of 
behavioural welfare economics cannot correct. 
 It is natural to ask whether behavioural welfare economists could adapt Savage’s 
method of error-correction as an alternative way of retrieving an individual’s latent 
preferences – perhaps through some kind of structured interviewing.29 But if such a method is 
to arrive at latent preferences that satisfy standard rationality requirements, there must be 
some framing of the relevant decision problems that induces preferences that satisfy those 
requirements and, crucially, this must be a frame that the individual herself approves. 
Imagine someone with no knowledge of decision theory who responds to Allais’s situations, 
presented in the probability distribution frame. Like Savage, she finds she prefers Gamble 1 
to Gamble 2, and Gamble 4 to Gamble 3. A behavioural economist, trying to retrieve the 
individual’s latent preferences (or a decision theorist, acting on Gilboa’s recommendation to 
go out and preach SEUT) guides her through the steps of Savage’s reasoning. The individual 
might get through Stage 1 (she agrees that the state/consequence frame is a realisation of the 
gambles), Stage 2 (she finds the same conditional preferences and beliefs as Savage did), and 
Stage 3 (the Sure-thing Rule seems right to her, and she reasons to (f′, g′, ≻Ω)). She gets to 
Stage 4 and becomes aware of having two contradictory preferences, (f′, g′, ≻Ω) and (g′, f′, 
                                                            
29 In one of the first contributions to behavioural welfare economics, Bleichrodt, Pinto-Prades and 
Wakker (2001) propose interactive interviewing as the methodological gold standard for correcting 
‘choice inconsistencies’ and thereby retrieving individuals’ latent preferences. 
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≻Ω)). As a result of automatic processes, one of them disappears. But if she is to satisfy P2, 
the preference that disappears must be (g′, f′, ≻Ω). What guarantees that? And if that 
preference does disappear, what prevents it from reappearing if she goes back to thinking in 
the probability distribution frame? In Savage’s case, the guarantee was his approval of the 
state/consequence frame, but we are not entitled to assume that other people share that sense 
of approval.  
7. Conclusion: Preaching rationality 
The mental experiment we have just described has a close counterpart in a famous early 
hypothetical-choice experiment reported by Slovic and Tversky (1974). Participants first 
responded to Allais’s situations, presented in the original probability distribution frame. 
Fifty-nine per cent of participants made Allais Paradox decisions; the others acted in 
consistency with P2, preferring the less risky gamble in both situations. Participants who had 
revealed Allais Paradox preferences were then exposed to Savage’s sure-thing argument, 
presented by a fictional Dr S, while those whose choices were consistent with SEUT were 
exposed to a fictional Dr A’s advocacy of Allais Paradox choices. All participants were then 
invited to reconsider their previous decisions. In both groups, most participants chose to stick 
with their original decisions; Dr A proved to be marginally more persuasive than Dr S. 
 In fact, the sample size (29 participants) was too small to produce statistically 
significant results, but let us imagine that Slovic and Tversky’s findings have been replicated 
in a much larger experiment. For a decision theorist who shared Gilboa’s position on 
‘preaching’, that would be evidence that, for a majority of people, the Sure-thing Principle is 
not a requirement of rationality. We take it that Savage (who in fact died before this 
experiment was reported) would not have accepted that conclusion. Recall that for Savage, 
the Sure-thing Principle has a status analogous with that of a rule of logic: it has a claim to 
‘universality’ or ‘objectivity’. As the author of a defence of a normative theory of rationality, 
he believes that he has a duty of good faith not to defend principles whose implications are 
contravened by preferences of his own that, upon careful reflection, he endorses. That is why 
it is important for him to respond to Allais. But it is entirely legitimate for him to argue in 
favour of principles that other people, perhaps upon equally careful reflection, reject. 
 In trying to convince his readers of the normativity of his theory, Savage is preaching. 
One might say that, in responding to Allais’s challenge, he is preaching to himself. His 
reasoning provides a model of how the preaching of rationality can be immune to Broome’s 
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objections to arguments that state rationality requirements without explaining how people can 
come to satisfy them. 
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